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THE CERTIFICATELESS SOCIETY
AND THE CONSTITUTION
JOHN MONTAGUE STEADMAN'"
SEC Commissioner Richard B. Smith has called for federal
legislation to abolish the stock certificate, thereby overriding con-
trary state laws. The author discusses the constitutional and policy
implications of the proposal.
"A national problem calling for a national solution." In a provoc-
ative address,' SEC Commissioner Richard B. Smith has thus character-
ized the present legal requirement of physical delivery and transfer of
stock certificates in securities transactions. His proposed solution is
adoption of federal legislation which would eliminate the stock certifi-
cate and provide for a securities processing system capable of handling
securities transactions in modem markets.
The purpose of this article is to present reflections on the constitu-
tional and policy implications of the Smith proposal. In the analysis,
two postulates are made.
First, the requirement of delivery and transfer of a stock certificate
2
has resulted in, and threatens further to result in, significant impedi-
ments to the smooth operation and functioning of the national securities
market.3
Second, any federal legislation adopted would be reasonably circum-
scribed so as to focus on the elimination of this particular problem
alone. No sweeping steps to eliminate all stock certificates of all state
corporations would necessarily be contemplated. For instance, federal
legislation might be limited in its application to those corporations
listed on national exchanges, or involved in extensive over-the-counter
trading, such as those subject to section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange
Act.4
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B., Yale
University, 1952; L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1955. The author wishes to thank Carl
F. Safanda, a Fellow of the Law School's Center for the Study of Financial Institutions,
for research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 "A Piece of Paper Revisited". Remarks before the American Bankers Association,
Trust Division, New York City, Feb. 8, 1971.
2 See generally UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 8, pt. 3. "Delivery" is necessary for
transfer (§ 8-301), although "delivery" is defined (§ 8-318) to make actual change of
possession unnecessary in certain cases; e.g., where a central depository system is established
under § 8-320 (such as the New York Stock Exchange's Central Certificate Service). Al-
though the expanded use of CCS appears to have been accepted as at least an interim
ameliorative (see Wall Street Journal, Apr. 20, 1971, at 2, col. 3), it may be forecast that
a permanent solution could well require more -the CCS system is both limited in its
availability and dependant upon voluntary adherence.
3 For documentation in addition to Commissioner Smith's recent address, see, e.g.,
36
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Such a process would be wholly in line with the "interstitial charac-
ter of federal law." In the typically lucid language of Hart and Wechsler:
Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted
on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It builds upon
legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting
them only so far as necessary for the special purpose. Congress
acts, in short, against the background of the total corpus juris of the
states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the back-
ground of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by
legislation. 5
SOURCES OF FEDERAL POWER
Federal legislation to abolish the stock certificate would most logi-
cally be based upon the constitutional power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. While the issue may once have been in doubt, it
is clear today that the commerce power applies to intangibles in inter-
state commerce, as well as to goods and merchandise.O "[T]hat transac-
tions on national securities exchanges have taken on an interstate
character, justifying regulation under the commerce clause, is now
beyond doubt."7
In thus attempting to regulate, control, and further the operation
of national markets, the Congress would act on a constitutional premise
extending back at least to Stafford v. Wallace8 (involving stockyards),
and Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen9 (which concerned the grain
futures exchange).
It is, of course, true that the adoption of the proposed federal
Robbins, Paper Crises in the Securities Industry: Causes and Cures, 51 LYBRAND J. No.
1&2 (1970) [hereinafter Robbins] (a study sponsored by Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery).
4 For studies on "The Certificateless Society," see Robbins, supra note 3; Symposium
on the Certificateless Society [hereinafter Symposium] -Werner, The Certificateless
Society: Why and When?, 26 Bus. Lmw. 605 (1971); Rassnick, Certificateless Deposits and
Transfers of Securities in the Federal Reserve System, id. 611; Mulhern, First Steps Toward
a Certificateless Society Under Existing Law: One Practitioner's Experience, id. 617; Stead-
man, The Lender in the Certificateless Society, id. 623; Jolls, The Uniform Commercial
Code and the Certificateless Society, id. 627; Dunne, Financial Paper, 48 HARV. Bus. REv.
90 (1970); and articles cited in 26 Bus. Lw. 623 n.3 (1971). L.S. Rassnick in his article in 26
Bus. LAw., supra, describes the operations of an already existing certificateless society,
viz., the system for the transfer of federal government securities by book entry alone
instituted by the Federal Reserve System and binding upon the states under the
supremacy clause.
5 H. HART, JR. & H. WECESLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AD THE FEDERAL SYsrmr 435
(1953).
6 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriter's Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
7 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1944), citing inter alia, Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 440 (1938).
8 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
9 262 U.S. 1 (1923); see also, United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 US. 110
(1942) (milk); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (bituminous
coal); Currino v. Wallace, 306 U.. 1 (1939) (tobacco).
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legislation in a sense would involve more than the direct regulation of
the market itself. As Commissioner Smith pointed out in his speech,
while present laws basically regulate the conduct of trading in the
national securities markets, the new legislation would regulate the con-
duct of processing and completing securities transactions effected in
those markets.
Such regulation might, in one light, be viewed as an impermissible
federal intrusion into an essentially intrastate process. However, it is
long since settled that activities that are in themselves intrastate may be
regulated by Congress if they "affect" interstate commerce. Strikingly
put in United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, "If it is inter-
state commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze."' 0
The doctrine received renewed affirmation in the Supreme Court
very recently in Perez v. United States.". There the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a criminal statute outlawing "loansharking" (ex-
tortionate credit transactions), even though the loan was entirely intra-
state and no showing was made that the defendant's activity had any
connection whatsoever with, or impact on, interstate commerce. It was
enough that the "class of activities" regulated had such ties.'2
The series of Supreme Court cases rejecting various attacks on the
Public Utility Holding Company Act reflects the virtually absolute
control that the Congress can exercise over even the very structure of
a corporation where interstate commerce is affected. In North Ameri-
can Co. v. SEC,'3 the SEC had ordered a holding company to divest
itself of subsidiaries. The Supreme Court postulated that the right
to own or retain property is typically a state law issue, but said:
The fact that an evil may involve a corporation's financial prac-
tices, its business structure or its security portfolio does not detract
from the power of Congress under the commerce clause to promul-
10 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
11402 U.S. 146 (1971).
12 A relatively recent listing of a number of other Supreme Court cases to this effect
may be found in Justice Black's concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 270-72 (1964). In perhaps the most famous of these cases,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), it was held that the federal government could con-
trol a farmer's growing of wheat on his own land for his own consumption since "even if
appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may
still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce ...." Id. at 125. See also the other leading case of United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Of course, under the commerce clause, Congress is
not limited simply to preventing abuses, but also may affirmatively promote interstate
commerce. See, e.g., The New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 189 (1923).
13 327 U.S. 686 (1946). Earlier in Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938),
the registration requirement of the Act had been upheld.
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gate rules in order to destroy that evil. Once it is established that
the evil concerns or affects commerce in more states than one,
Congress may act.14
A few months later, in American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,' 5 the
Court sustained an SEC order requiring the actual dissolution of two
subsidiaries of a holding company, again affirming in sweeping terms
Congressional power over corporate structure and activities under the
commerce clause.
A particularly illustrative lower court case involving federal con-
trol of the details of the stock structure of a corporation is Common-
wealth & Southern Corp. v. SEC,' where the company challenged the
constitutionality of SEC action under 11(b) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act. The SEC had ordered the elimination of all
preferred stock of the company and the consolidation of the company's
corporate structure into a single class of common stock. In sustaining
the action, the court noted:
It may be conceded, as Commonwealth urges, that the right
to exist as a corporation, the power to own and vote stock in sub-
sidiary companies, the right to issue stock having designated pref-
erences, priorities, voting power and other rights, and the right
to retire or redeem securities are all local matters, normally regu-
lated by the laws of the state. It does not follow that Congress is
restricted in the exercise of the commerce power because any or
all of these rights are affected thereby. That is the fundamental
weakness of Commonwealth's contention that if section 11(b) (2) is
construed so as to permit an order which deals solely with the
corporate structure of the holding company and the rights of the
stockholders among themselves it is unconstitutional because out-
side the power conferred by the commerce clause. Such a contention
takes entirely too narrow a view of the extent of the power con-
ferred upon Congress by the commerce clause .... It is immaterial
whether the effect upon interstate commerce is direct or indirect
if the activities exert a substantial economic effect on that com-
merce.
1 7
Indeed, if the power of the federal government exists under the
Constitution, it is no obstacle that sovereign powers and interests of
the state itself are thereby interfered with. In Maryland v. Wirtz, the
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the extension of
the Fair Labor Standards Act to state-owned and operated hospitals
14 327 U.S. at 406.
15 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
16 134 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1948).
17 Id. at 752-53.
1971]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and schools was permissible.' 8 The argument was made that such an
extension was an unconstitutional interference by Congress with state
sovereign powers. In holding the Act applicable, the Court noted that
"It is clear that the Federal Government, when acting within a dele-
gated power, may override countervailing state interests, whether
these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character."'19
The basic doctrine is hardly novel.20 A recent case on the general
point in the securities field is SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 21 where
the Court upheld the power of the SEC under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 to seek, as an appropriate
remedy, to unwind a corporate merger specifically approved by the
Arizona Director of Insurance under state law.
It is equally clear that it is for Congress, not the courts, to deter-
mine whether regulation is advisable, and what form it should take.
The deference that the Supreme Court will show to such determina-
tions by Congress is illustrated in Katzenbach v. McClung.22 The Court
there pointed out that where the Congress, in light of the facts and
testimony before it, has "a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce," the investigation
of the Court is at an end.23
It should be added that the commerce clause does not stand alone
as a possible source of federal power to enact legislation on a certifi-
cateless society. In adopting, for example, the Securities Exchange Act,
the Congress invoked a panoply of constitutional considerations: to
18 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
19 Id. at 195.
20 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). Second Em-
ployers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1912). In Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United
States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925), the Court sustained an injunction prohibiting the District
from taking more water from Lake Michigan than allowed by the Secretary of War.
"There is no question that this power [to remove obstructions to interstate and foreign
commerce] is superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of its
inhabitants." Id. at 426.
21 593 U.S. 453 (1969).
22 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
23 Id. at 304. Other examples abound. Thus, in Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,
313 U.S. 508 (1941), the state challenged the construction of a dam on a non-navigable
river on the ground that the project exceeded the power of Congress and was contrary
to the sovereign and proprietary rights of the state. The Court said:
It is for Congress alone to decide whether a particular project, by itself or as
part of a more comprehensive scheme, will have such a beneficial effect on the
arteries of interstate commerce as to warrant it ... nor is it for us to determine
whether the resulting benefits to commerce as a result of this particular exercise
by Congress of the commerce power outweigh the costs of the undertaking .. .
nor may we inquire into the motives of members of Congress .. . it is suffi-
cient for us that Congress has exercised its commerce power, though other purposes
will also be served.
Id. at 527-28.
[Vol. 46:36
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protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the federal taxing
power, the national banking system,24 and the postal power.2 5
STATE INTERESTS AND FEDERAL POWER
It is not unusual for Congress to deliberately stop short of ex-
tending a regulatory scheme under the commerce clause to the full
limits of constitutional permissiveness.2 6 Indeed, where a new exertion
of federal power will touch upon what are traditionally state areas of
concern, one might anticipate that legislation would be drafted with
a particular aim of confining its application.
In this regard, it may be useful to examine briefly the principal
areas of state concern that might be affected by enactment of federal
legislation relating to the certificateless society, and to see the extent
to which such state interests might in fact be infringed upon. Such an
analysis can also be useful in testing further the constitutional founda-
tion for such legislation.
A convenient way to approach this problem is to examine the
provisions of state law that would have to be amended if a state were
to adopt legislation making it a certificateless society. While the details
would vary, depending on the exact nature of the statutory scheme
decided upon, it seems generally agreed that the three chief areas
affected are the regulation of corporate structure and procedures (i.e.,
state corporation laws), the regulation of the transfer of and perfection
of security interests in stock ownership of corporations (Articles 8 and
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code), and the regulation of fidu-
ciaries. 27
Corporation Laws
It is interesting that the proposal for federal legislation to create
a certificateless society may resurrect a debate almost a hundred years
old. Louis Loss reports that around the turn of the century, the ques-
tion of whether federal incorporation should be required of all corpo-
rations engaged in interstate commerce was a popular topic among
high school debaters 28 Argument over the pros and cons of the proposi-
24 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
25 U.S. CONsr., art. 1, § 8(7).
26 See, e.g., the gradual expansion of the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
briefly outlined in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 185-87 (1968).
27 See Symposium, supra note 4.
28 With respect to common carriers in interstate commerce, ICC approval has long
been required for any issuance of securities. 49 U.S.C. § 20(a), sustained as constitutional,
Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co. v. ICC, 293 F. 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1923), appeal dismissed, 266
U.S. 640 (1924). The power of the ICC is plenary and exclusive. Schwabacher v. United
19711
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tion rumbled on for several decades, until essentially quieted by the
enactment of the series of federal securities acts after 1933.29
Talk of "federal corporation law" has, of course, again come to
the fore, particularly in connection with the judicial interpretations
of rule 1Ob-5.30 But the distinction between the older discussions of a
federal corporation law and the recent ones is significant. The former
contemplated a general federal regulatory scheme comparable to that
now exercised by each state-i.e., the creation of federally chartered
corporations. The more recent discussions have focused on the fact
that by the securities acts and other legislation and judicial interpreta-
tions, a substantial body of federal law is supplementing or superseding
state corporation laws in selected areas. 31
The important point for present purposes is the fact that in
enacting legislation for a certificateless society, the aim would dearly
not be to "pre-empt the whole field of corporate affairs." 32 Rather, it
would be designed to eliminate a specific evil impeding the smooth
operation of interstate commerce and threatening the soundness of
the market for the investor.3
While such legislation would not regulate the market directly,
its rationale would be in line with existing provisions of federal securi-
ties laws to control conditions with indirect but adverse market
effects.34 For example, in speaking of a much-discussed provision of
the federal securities laws, the Fifth Circuit noted: "Section 10(b)
[of the Securities Exchange Act] is not concerned so much with fraud
per se as it is with the effect of fraud upon investors and upon the
public interest in the maintenance of free and open securities markets
nurtured in a climate of fair dealing. " 5
States, 334 U.S. 182, 197 (1948); cf. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.
Ry. Co., 282 U.S. 311 (1931).
29 L. Loss, SECuRITIES REGULATION 107-11 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter Loss]; but see
Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433, 480-81
(1968) (proposes a comprehensive federal corporation law).
30 A recent discussion may be found in Note, "Federal Corporation Law" and lOb-5:
The Case for Codification, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 274 (1970). See also note 31 infra,
and the Ruder article cited therein.
81 See, e.g., Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REV.
1146 (1965) [hereinafter Fleischer]; Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law
of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 185 (1964).
32 Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
33 Compare the Investment Company Act, which in many regards is in truth a charter
of sweeping federal control over the capital structure and corporate action of investment
companies. See Brown v. Bullock, 194 F.Supp. 207, 217-19 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415
(2d Cir. 1961); Fleischer, supra note 31, at 1153.
34For a short general exposition, see Shade, Duties of Publicly Held Corporations
under the Federal Securities Laws, 26 Bus. Lw. 497 (1970).
35 Herpick v, Wallace, 430 F,2d 792, 808 (5th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 46:36
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Generally, it can be said that already, "the Federal securities
laws and rules have created standards of conduct that directly affect
management behavior and corporate activity."36 The most graphic
example, perhaps, for present purposes is the structure of federal
control over proxies.37 Thus, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,3 the Supreme
Court held that the federal law on false proxy solicitation authorized
broad relief, despite the provisions of state corporation law. "The
protection of investors," a stated purpose of the statute, was seen to
require such a holding. The insider trading and Section 10(b) provi-
sions discussed hereafter are further examples of such federal controls.
The legislation under discussion would fall within this pattern of
selected control of specific problem areas.
Uniform Commercial Code
Here, again, the specter of a debate of years past may arise. At
one time in the drafting and development of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the possibility of its adoption by Congress, with nationwide
applicability, thereby avoiding the laborious task of attempting to
persuade fifty state legislatures, was considered. An early draft of the
Code did, in fact, make available adoption of a code at the federal
level. 39 However, the drafters ultimately returned to the conservative
basic philosophy underlying the Uniform State Laws, as described
by Professor Allison Dunham, viz., "uniformity of law by voluntary
state action," as a means of "removing any excuse for the federal
government to absorb power thought to belong rightfully to the
states."4
0
However, here again, it will be seen that the proposal to enact at
the federal level provisions dealing with the transfer of, and perfection
of security interests in, the shares of traded corporations would not
attempt to be a general regulation of the commercial field, but rather
a specific cure of a limited problem. Provisions of the Ship Mortgage
36Fleischer, supra note 31, at 1151.
37 Loss, supra note 29, at 857 et seq.
382 77 U.S. 426 (1964).
39 Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 100 (1951).
40 Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 233 (1965); see R. SPEImEL, R. SuRbamEs & J. WHrrE,
TEACHING MATEMALS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACrIONs 31 (1969). The constitutionality of a
comprehensive federal commercial code is discussed in 45 MIcH. L. Rav. 1021 (1947); see
also Schnader, The Uniform Commercial Code - Today and Tomorrow, 22 Bus. LAW. 229,
232 (1966). Schnader, Why the Commercial Code Should be "Uniform," 20 WASH. & LEE
L. RaV. 237, 238 (1963). Comment, Uniformity of the Commercial Code, 8 B.C. IND. & Cord.
L. REv. 568, 572-73 (1967).
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Act of 192041 and of the Federal Aviation Act,2 illustrate previous
efforts to deal at a federal level with sales and hypothecation of certain
types of property.
In the same vein, but more recently, several consumer protec-
tion bills have been enacted by the Congress.43 While more compre-
hensive in scope than the two acts referred to, this form of legislation,
nevertheless, focuses on a limited number of specific abuses: conceal-
ment of credit costs, improper collection practices, credit rating in-
justices, and so forth.44
The question of the scope of the provisions of these acts, as applied
to seemingly purely local intrastate transactions, may be noted. As far
as policy is concerned, although the sections generally apply to all trans-
actions,45 Congress took pains to preserve the applicability of consistent
state laws.46 In addition, the federal law governing certain aspects of
credit transactions is explicitly suspended in favor of state laws which
provide substantially the same consumer protection as the federal
law.47 This provision was designed to prompt state action such "that
after a period of years the need for any Federal legislation will have
been reduced to a minimum.148 The provisions establishing criminal
penalties for extortionate credit transactions also apply to all trans-
actions without any showing of connection with interstate commerce. 49
As already discussed, the constitutionality of these provisions has been
attacked, but sustained, as a valid exercise of power under the com-
merce clause. 50
4146 U.S.C. §§ 91 et seq. (1964).
42 49 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq., sustained as a valid exercise of power under the Admiralty
Clause, The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
43 See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1964), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 891 et seq. (1964). Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.
44 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967) (Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act) [hereinafter H.R. RaP. No. 1040].
45 That is not to say such sweeping coverage went unopposed. See, e.g., Hearings on
Truth in Lending, Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 288
et seq. (1967). The Fair Credit Reporting Act is related to interstate commerce. The
definition of "consumer reporting agency" covered by that act requires that the agency
"use any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnish-
ing consumer reports." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1964).
46 See H. R. REP'. No. 1040, supra note 44, at 1977; 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (1964); 18 U.S.C.
§ 896 (1964); 15 U.S.C. § 1681(t) (1964); cf. Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 317 F. Supp.
948 (D. Minn. 1970).
47 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1964).
48 S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1967).
49 18 U.S.C. §§ 891 et seq. (1964).
50 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). In United States v. Synnes, noted in
39 U.S.L.W. 2469 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1971), the Eighth Circuit, on February 1, 1971, sustained
the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting mere possession of a firearm by a felon. It
held that Congress had a "rational basis" for finding that such possession "affects [inter-
state] commerce." Cf. United States v. Bass, 434 F.2d 1296 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 402
[Vol. 46:36
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Fiduciary Interests
State law has generally predominated in regulating fiduciary
relationships. The elimination of the stock certificate would perforce
require fiduciaries to modify their operational procedures to some
extent.
This effect, however, would be at best indirect. Certainly it is
far short of provisions of the various securities acts which, in some
areas, are already directly controlling fiduciary relationships; e.g.,
insider trading and fraud provisions,51 the Trust Indenture Act, the
Investment Adviser Act,52 and the Investment Company Act.53 Re-
ferring back to the discussion as to the appropriate and permissible
extent of federal control, it is interesting to contrast the limitation of
section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act (insider trading) to section
12 corporations only, with the broad scope of section 10 of that Act
(the general anti-fraud provision) and rule lOb-5, which apparently
is applicable to all securities transactions where the mails or other
interstate facilities are used.54 Thus, section 10 has been held to apply
to sales of securities of a foreign corporation between foreign buyers
and sellers,5 5 and to sales of stock of a close corporation made by intra-
state telephone calls. 56 Indeed the scope of section 10 and rule lOb-5,
as judicially interpreted, has led one prominent commentator to label
this development - with more precision than most - as the "Federal
Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations." 57
One particular operational problem specially mentioned in the
fiduciary area is the common state law requirement that fiduciaries
segregate physically and separately the property they so hold with
US. 927 (1971). White v. United States, 395 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 928
(1968) (Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act).
S I Sections 10b and 16 of the Securities Exchange Act. See Loss, supra note 29, at 1037
et seq. A recent lucid discussion of the expanding federal control over insiders' transactions
appears in Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate "Insiders"
in the United States, 33 MODERN L. R v. 34 (1970).
52 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (noting the "fiduci-
ary relationship" of the advisor to his clients).
53 See, e.g., Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 266 (1959).
54 See Loss at 1466-67.
55 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 US. 906 (1969) (stock was listed on American Stock Ex-
change). See Note, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Cor-
poration Law, 55 VA. L. Rav. 1103 (1969).
56 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (inter-
state checks also involved); but see Burke v. Triple A Machine Shop, CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 92,949 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1971) (two local telephone calls to officer of corporation
are not enough).
57 Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations
-- Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289 (1971).
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respect to each fiduciary relationship. In New York, for example, this
requirement has presented an obstacle to the full functioning of the
Central Certificate Service of the New York Stock Exchange.
A partial New York reaction was the enactment of the so-called
FOSBI amendment, permitting some commingling.58 The adoption
of some comparable provision in this regard at the federal level might
prove necessary, but this would seem to constitute only a modest
inroad into the functioning of the normal fiduciary laws of each state.
Other Provisions
There are, of course, numerous other state laws of a lesser nature
which would be affected by the creation of a certificateless society.59
An informal compilation of such state laws has been made by the legal
study group of BASIC,00 and no insurmountable problem is known
to have yet been found.
CONCLUSION
In short, no constitutional impediment appears to exist to the
enactment of federal legislation to deal with the problem created by
the continuing requirement of stock certificate transfers. Indeed, it
is not to be expected that difficulty in that regard will be found by a
Supreme Court which has upheld federal power under the commerce
clause to control the activities of a snack bar on an Arkansas country
lake,61 the growing of wheat by a farmer to feed his own livestock, -2
or the sale of milk produced by Illinois cows grazing on Illinois farms
and sold to Illinois drinkers.6 While it may be conceded that the
"power to regulate commerce, though broad indeed, has limits,"64 the
enactment of reasonable legislation designed to deal with the stock
certificate would seem neither to test those limits nor to unacceptably
interfere with the state interests discussed above.
"We reaffirm once more the constitutional authority resident in
58N.Y.E.P.T.L. §§ 11-l.lb(9) & 11-1.6(c) (McKinney 1970).
59 Other federal laws may also be affected. See, e.g., Note, Stock-Brokerage Bankrupt-
cies: Implementing CCS, 54 CORNELL L.Q. 750 (1969).
60 BASIC is the Banking and Securities Industry Committee, located at 84 William
Street in New York City. It started operations on June 1, 1970. The executive director
is Herman W. Bevis, a retired senior partner of Price, Waterhouse & Co. See BASIC
YEAR-END REP. 7 (Feb. 1971).
61 Daniel v. Paul, 895 U.S. 298 (1969).
02 United States v. Haley. 858 U.S. 644 (1959).
63 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 815 U.S. 710 (1942).
04 Maryland v. Wirtz, 892 U.S. 188, 206 (1968).
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Congress by virtue of the commerce clause to undertake to solve na-
tional problems directly and realistically, giving due recognition to
the scope of state power."' 65 This end the Smith proposal might well
serve.
65 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 829 U.S. 90, 108 (1946).
